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ROOM FOR ERROR ONLINE: REVISING
GEORGIA’S RETRACTION STATUTE TO
ACCOMMODATE THE RISE OF INTERNET
MEDIA
Lisa Boggs*
INTRODUCTION
It started, as do many lawsuits, with a relationship gone sour: A
Georgia man facing a DUI charge had fired his attorney, alleging a
“half-hearted excuse for a defense” and requesting his $3,000 flat fee
be refunded.1 The attorney declined to do so.2 Nearly three years
later, the former client began a series of postings on his personal
website—a self-labeled “Political Forum”—in which he accused the
attorney of bribing judges on behalf of drug dealers.3 At the close of
one posting, the former client predicted that the attorney “will never
make one single move against me or this website.”4
He was wrong, as it turned out. The attorney not only alleged libel,
but prior to filing suit he also sent a letter demanding that the exclient retract the offensive postings.5 The reason for the request
seems clear at first: As in several other states,6 Georgia will bar
punitive damages if the libel plaintiff fails to ask for a retraction.7
*J.D. Candidate, 2012 Georgia State University College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professors
Katie Wood and Lynn Hogue for their assistance and guidance.
1. Milum v. Banks, 642 S.E.2d 892, 893–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
2. Id. at 894.
3. Id. At one point, the website referred to the attorney as a “Drug Dealer Bribery Mule.” Id. The
same posting concluded with the following: “Rafe, don’t you wish you had given back my three
thousand dollar retainer when I asked you too, [sic] because I found out you were helping them set me
up?” Id.
4. Id.
5. Milum, 642 S.E.2d at 894.
6. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-237 (West 2005);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.02 (West 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 93 (West 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2010). Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-43-03 (2008) (requiring libel plaintiffs to
submit correction requests to maintain a libel action and also limiting damages to “provable economic
loss” if the request comes more than ninety days after publication).
7. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(b)(2), (c) (2000).

923

Published by Reading Room, 2012

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 16

924

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

Likewise, the defendant can avoid punitive damages if he makes the
requested retraction.8
But should this sort of immunity—avoiding punitive damages via
retraction—be available for this “Political Forum” and other
websites?9 Georgia’s current retraction statute was written decades
before the Internet, and thus it refers only to “newspaper[s] or other
publication[s].”10 The Georgia Supreme Court in Mathis v. Cannon
seemingly answered this question in 2002 by interpreting
“publication” as covering Internet postings.11 Thus, with one
decision, the court declared that all online content—down to the most
informal blog and message board12—receives a protection
traditionally applied to large-scale, institutionalized news-gathering,
media-like newspapers.13
While the majority praises its opinion as an egalitarian move to
protect both lone blogger and media corporations alike,14 the Mathis
dissent raises two key criticisms. First, allowing any Internet user to
8. Id. § 51-5-11(b)(1)(B), (c) (stating that the defendant shall be liable for actual damages if “the
defendant, in a regular issue of the newspaper or other publication in question, within seven days after
receiving a written demand, or in the next regular issue of the newspaper or other publication following
receipt of the demand if the next regular issue was not published within seven days after receiving the
demand, corrected and retracted the allegedly libelous statement in as conspicuous and public a manner
as that in which the alleged libelous statement was published”).
9. As for the attorney and his ex-client, the retraction request opened the door for punitive damages,
but the trial jury only awarded the attorney $50,000 in general damages. Milum, 642 S.E.2d at 895, 898.
The trial court had determined the attorney was a limited public figure and thus was required to prove
that the ex-client had acted with actual malice if punitive damages were to be awarded. Id. at 896, 897.
To the jurors, that burden was not met. Id. at 897. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling. Id.
at 898.
10. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(b)(2) (2000). In 1939, the retraction statute applied to a “newspaper,
magazine or periodical.” 1939 Ga. Laws 343, 344. By 1960, the statute had been reworded to
“newspaper or other publication.” 1960 Ga. Laws 198, 199.
11. Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 385 (Ga. 2002) (“[W]e construe the word ‘publication’
in . . . the retraction statute as meaning a communication made to any person other than the party
libeled. Under this interpretation, the retraction statute applies to the words that Mathis wrote in his
messages posted on [an online] bulletin board . . . .”).
12. See, e.g., Atlanta Humane Soc’y v. Mills, 618 S.E.2d 18, 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (regarding
alleged libelous statements made on an Internet message board about the Atlanta Humane Society’s
policies with regard to euthanasia, adoption, and cruelty investigations, including a reference to the
Humane Society’s director as “Mr. Kill”).
13. See 1939 Ga. Laws 343, 344 (restating the initial retraction statute, which applied to a
“newspaper, magazine or periodical”).
14. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 385 (holding that interpreting “publication” to mean Internet content
“supports free speech by extending the same protection to the private individual who speaks on matters
of public concern as newspapers and other members of the press now enjoy”).
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avoid punitive damages by retracting the libelous material “asks no
self-censorship” of the users.15 Unlike newspapers or TV stations,
which are held accountable by advertisers, consumers, and threats of
litigation, individuals with their own Web content have the freedom
to post false, defamatory statements, always knowing they can avoid
punitive damages by retracting.16 Second, if the state legislature had
intended for the retraction statute to cover Internet content, it could
have revised the statute itself to specifically reference online
materials.17 Instead, the court gave new meaning to the statute, and
reached a result that consequently conflicts with several other states’
judicial interpretations of pre-Internet libel laws.18
This Note will address both of these criticisms by proposing a
revision of Georgia’s retraction law. Part I examines retraction’s
overall role in libel litigation and takes a closer look at Georgia’s
statute as well as the Mathis decision.19 Part II compares Mathis to
the approaches other states have taken regarding electronic-media
retractions.20 In particular, Part II examines California’s recent case
law that only requires retractions when the publisher is involved in
the rapid dissemination of news, as opposed to the casual Web
poster.21 Finally, Part III proposes a revision to Georgia’s retraction
statute that will both avoid blanket punitive damage immunity for
online content, while also returning the statute’s focus to protecting
news-gathering sources.22

15. Id. at 389 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
16. See Alice Horton, Note, Beyond Control? The Rise and Fall of Defamation Regulation on the
Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2009) (“The Internet no longer requires technical computing
language to navigate effectively; instead, the Internet is provided by the mere click of a mouse, and
widespread broadband Internet access allows virtually anyone to become a publisher.”).
17. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 388 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that notice requirements in the libel statute are not applicable to a private individual who
posted on an Internet message board); It’s In The Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that a retraction statute which references newspapers, magazines, and periodicals
does not apply to an Internet message board).
19. See discussion infra Part I.
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. RETRACTION AND ITS ROLE IN LIBEL LAW
A. Retraction’s Emergence In Libel Cases
1. Evolving Burden of Proof for Libel
At common law, defamation23 involves a communication that is a
false statement of fact “of and concerning” another party.24 The
communication must be injurious to reputation,25 and it must be
“published,” or communicated to a third party.26 Traditionally,
defamation came in two forms: (1) libel, encompassing defamation
that was written or could be read; and (2) slander, which covers
spoken defamation.27 However, as mass media has evolved, libel now
typically covers not just the written word, but also the spoken word—
heard via radio, television, and films.28
Libel itself has evolved from common law into a matter of state
law, with legislatures crafting their own definition of “defamation” as
well as specifying the types of media in which libel can appear.29 In
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (listing the essential elements of the tort of
defamation as follows: “(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged
publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication”).
24. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW
OF MASS MEDIA 66 (3d ed. 1985) (stating that while the defamatory content does not have to directly
name the plaintiff, the third party receiving the content must realize that it “concerns” the plaintiff).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); accord MICHAEL F. MAYER, THE LIBEL
REVOLUTION: A NEW LOOK AT DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY 36 (1987) (listing examples of statements
that courts have found defamatory, including accusations that an attorney is a swindler, a minister is
unethical, and a businessman charges excessive prices).
26. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 976 (8th ed. 2006) (clarifying
that “publication,” in regards to defamation, “has nothing to do with mass circulation or with putting a
statement into print”); DAVID PRICE & KORIEH DUODO, DEFAMATION LAW: PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
23 (3d ed. 2004) (defining a “publication” as “the communication of [a] defamatory matter by the
defendant to at least one person other than the claimant”).
27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927, 1392 (7th ed. 1999); see also MAYER, supra note 25, at 109.
28. See MAYER, supra note 25, at 109; WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 108
(13th ed. 2002); see also Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, Annotation, Individual and Corporate Liability
for Libel and Slander in Electronic Communications, Including E-mail, Internet and Websites, 3
A.L.R.6th 153 (2005) (discussing a failed attempt to classify Internet postings as slander rather than
libel on the argument that they are communicated by a mechanical means rather than by traditional
written publications).
29. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 972; 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 326 (2011).
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Georgia, for instance, libel is defined by statute as a “false and
malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures,
or signs, tending to injure the reputation of the person and exposing
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”30
Until 1964, libel primarily operated under the doctrine of strict
liability: if a false, defamatory statement that clearly identified a
party was published, damages would be allowed.31 However, with the
United States Supreme Court decisions in New York Times v.
Sullivan32 and Gertz v. Welch,33 the landscape of libel law shifted
significantly.34 In Sullivan, the Court held that if a plaintiff is deemed
a “public official,”35 he may only collect damages after showing that
the defendant, with “actual malice,” published defamatory content
relating to the plaintiff’s official conduct.36 Actual malice, as a
burden of proof, requires that the defendant publish the defamation
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”37
Ten years later, the Supreme Court held in Gertz that, while
private individuals were not constitutionally bound to the same actual
malice standard as public plaintiffs, they were nonetheless required to
prove some level of fault (such as negligence, recklessness, or, if the
state law chooses to go so far, even actual malice).38 Further, only
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-1(a) (2000).
31. See MAYER, supra note 25, at 1.
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
34. See MAYER, supra note 25, at 1–6 (describing New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Welch as
having initiated a “libel revolution”).
35. In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the “actual malice” standard for public officials to “public
figures” as well. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (“We consider and would
hold that a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”).
36. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283–84.
37. Id. at 279–80.
38. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–48. “Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person
would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such a person under
the existing circumstances would not have done.” R.R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1877).
“Recklessness” is “[c]onduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful consequence[s] but nonetheless
foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk,” or alternatively as a “state of mind in which a
person does not care about the consequences of his or her actions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1277
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showings of actual malice would trigger punitive damages for private
individuals; unless the defendant knowingly published untrue
material or acted recklessly as to its validity, the plaintiff could only
be compensated for actual losses.39
This abandonment of strict liability in favor of higher burdens of
proof, as the Supreme Court explained, is intended to safeguard First
Amendment freedoms; by making it harder for plaintiffs to bring
about a libel suit, the media can tackle controversial stories without
the crippling fear of libel litigation.40 Thus, Sullivan and its progeny
added a layer of constitutional concerns over what had been
traditionally a matter for the states.41
2. Using Retraction to Limit Damages
These heightened burdens of proof lay the groundwork for the
evidentiary role that retraction plays in libel litigation.42 In general, in
a defamation context, a retraction is an unequivocal withdrawal of
(7th ed. 1999). Actual malice requires that the defendant publish the defamation “with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. For more
on the level of fault in libel cases, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
757–61 (1985) (addressing the requisite level of fault for punitive damages when the libelous material
involves a private individual’s private concern). See also infra note 39.
39. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. This actual malice requirement for private individuals was later limited to
only those matters involving public concerns. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761, 763. In Dun &
Bradstreet, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an erroneous credit report, which was distributed to only
five subscribers, did not involve a matter of public concern. Id. at 751, 762. Hence, the plaintiff did not
have to prove actual malice to receive punitive damages. Id. at 763.
40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional
protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate. . . . And punishment of error runs the risk of
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and
press.”); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (holding that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they
‘need . . . to survive’” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). In Sullivan’s majority
opinion, Justice Brennan went so far as to say that erroneous statements would actually make a positive
contribution to public debate, as errors would make the truth stand out more clearly in contrast. Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 279 n.19.
41. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 14:8 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has imposed constitutional limitations on the use of state law to protect reputation interests in favor of
protecting the willingness of commentators to express viewpoints and debate issues . . . .”); see also
OVERBECK, supra note 28, at 132 (“This [actual malice] language is among the most important ever
written on mass media law in America.”).
42. See generally W.E. Shipley, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statute Limiting
Damages Recoverable for Defamation, 13 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950) (discussing the connection between
fulfilled retraction requests and showings of both good faith and absence of actual malice).
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the defamatory content by that content’s producer.43 It has been
argued that requiring a retraction request prior to the libel suit
encourages both parties to remedy the situation themselves rather
than fight over damages in court.44 For traditional news media, such a
requirement also serves as an incentive to correct what is ultimately
false,45 thus preserving the right to report freely46 while mitigating
any damage to an individual’s reputation.47
But more commonly, states fashion retraction statutes as a way to
limit the damages48 that are ultimately awarded .49 More specifically,
many of these statutes, including Georgia’s,50 will not allow plaintiffs
to seek punitive damages—thus limiting them to only compensatory
damages—unless they first request the libelous material be

43. Elad Peled, Constitutionalizing Mandatory Retraction in Defamation Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 33, 34 (2007); see also STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 447 (5th ed. 2003)
(emphasizing that a retraction should be full and unequivocal, with no indication of hesitancy).
44. MAYER, supra note 25, at 133; Peled, supra note 43, at 34. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Pain
and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359
(2006) (discussing the challenges in using compensatory means to rectify reputational harm).
45. Peled, supra note 43, at 36 (“The aim of [retraction] statutes is, essentially, to protect
[publishers’] interests by allowing them to evade the risk of monetary liability.”). But see Horton, supra
note 16, at 1293 (noting that retracting “places the burden upon the plaintiff in a defamation action” to
avoid or minimize damages).
46. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding “a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”
must be considered within any discussion of defamation).
47. Peled, supra note 43, at 34 (noting that retraction is preferable to tort actions because it can avoid
the problem of calculating noneconomic losses to reputation).
48. Damages for defamation may be divided into three categories: (1) nominal damages, which are
given to acknowledge the defamation in the absence of any actual injury; (2) compensatory damages,
which equate with the actual injuries suffered by the defamation; and (3) punitive damages, which are
regarded as punishment for the offender. Shipley, supra note 42, § 1(a).
49. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 2007) (“[P]laintiff shall recover no more than special
damages unless a correction be demanded and be not published or broadcast . . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-237 (West 2005) (“[U]nless the plaintiff proves . . . that the defendant, after having been
requested by the plaintiff in writing to retract the libelous charge, in as public a manner as that in which
it was made, failed to do so within a reasonable time, the plaintiff shall recover nothing but such actual
damage as the plaintiff may have specially alleged and proved.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 93
(West 2000) (“If within a reasonable time after receiving notice in writing from the plaintiff . . . the
defendant . . . publishes a reasonable retraction, . . . the plaintiff shall recover only for any actual
damage sustained.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2010) (“[T]he plaintiff shall recover no more
than special damages, unless a retraction be demanded and refused . . . .”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-43-03
(2008) (“[A] person who, within ninety days after knowledge of the publication, fails to make a good
faith attempt to request a correction or clarification may recover only provable economic loss.”).
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(b)(2), (c) (2000).
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retracted.51 This aligns with the traditional treatment of punitive
damages,52 which are typically limited to showings of actual
malice.53 In this sense, complying with the retraction request serves
as evidence that the plaintiff did not publish libelous material
knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth.54
B. Georgia’s Retraction Statute As Interpreted In Mathis
In Georgia, a libel plaintiff who seeks punitive damages is required
to submit a written demand for the publisher to retract the allegedly
defamatory statement.55Upon receipt of such a request, the defendant
has seven days to comply.56 If the defendant successfully completes
this request, she avoids paying punitive damages (though she may
still be found liable for compensatory damages).57 The defendant
may also use the retraction in her argument to mitigate damages.58
All of this appears straightforward—except that the current statute,
crafted fifty years ago,59 requires the retraction to be placed in “a
regular issue of the newspaper or other publication.”60 As with nearly
all retraction statutes in the United States,61 Georgia’s makes no
51. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-237 (West 2005);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 93 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2010). But see
Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (S.C. 1958) (holding that, absent an express
statutory provision, a retraction may mitigate libel damages, but it does not bar punitive damages).
52. For a discussion of the constitutional challenges mounted against punitive-damage limits in
defamation statutes, see Shipley, supra note 42, § 3.
53. See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (allowing punitive damages for a private plaintiff
when the defamation involved a private concern).
54. Peled, supra note 43, at 35.
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(b)(2), (c) (2000).
56. Id. § 51-5-11(b)(1)(B). If the next regular issue is not published within seven days, the retraction
must be published in the next regular issue after receiving the demand. Id.
57. Id. § 51-5-11(c) (stating that, upon proof that the plaintiff in a libel action made a request for a
retraction and the defendant fulfilled such request within the stated time limit, “the plaintiff shall not be
entitled to any punitive damages and the defendant shall be liable only to pay actual damages”).
58. Id. (“The defendant may plead the publication of the correction, retraction, or explanation,
including the editorial, if demanded, in mitigation of damages.”).
59. 1960 Ga. Laws 198, 199.
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(b)(1)(B) (2000).
61. North Dakota remains the noteworthy exception, as its retraction statute specifically references
electronic media. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-43-02 (2008) (“This chapter applies to all publications,
including writings, broadcasts, oral communications, electronic transmissions, or other forms of
transmitting information.”); see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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specific reference to postings that appear on the Internet.62 What
then, does this mean for defamatory content that shows up online?
The answer—perhaps belatedly—arrived in 2002, when the
Georgia Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Mathis v.
Cannon.63 This case grew out of a dispute involving a solid waste
facility in Crisp County.64 Bruce Mathis was among a group of
residents who openly criticized the financially struggling facility, as
well as the company that hauled waste into the county for processing,
TransWaste Services.65 On Nov. 4, 1999, Mathis submitted online
postings to a Yahoo! message board, in which he called
TransWaste’s executive, Thomas C. “Chris” Cannon, a “crook” and a
“thief.”66
Cannon sued Mathis for libel,67 asking for compensatory damages
as well as $1 million in punitive damages.68 The trial court granted
partial summary judgment on liability to Cannon, and the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed.69 But the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed, finding that, among other issues,70 Cannon could not claim
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11 (2000).
63. 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002).
64. Id. at 377. The facility “was designed to separate residential and commercial garbage or solid
waste, sell the recyclable ‘materials of value,’ and produce commercial compost from the organic
materials, with the residual waste being deposited in the county’s landfill.” Id. at 378.
65. Id. at 378–79. Mathis was a member of the Crisp Watchdogs, a group of Crisp County residents
who “regularly attended [waste management] authority and commission meetings, asked critical
questions, and made negative statements about the authority’s operations and finances.” Id. at 379. The
Crisp Watchdogs also initiated a recall effort against three county commissioners. Id.
66. Id. at 379. Mathis’ message at 11:14 p.m. included the following: “stop the trash flow cannon we
would love u for it—our country not a dumping ground and sorry u and lt governor are mad about it—
but that is not going to float in crisp county—so get out now you thief.” Id. Mathis posted a second
message, titled “cannon a crook????”, at 11:27 p.m., which stated, “explain to us why us got fired from
the calton company please???? want hear your side of the story cannon!!!!!!!!” Id. At 11:52 p.m. Mathis
posted a third message titled “cannon a crook,” in which he wrote, “if u deal with cannon u a crook
too!!!!!!!” Id.
67. Id. at 377.
68. Richmond Eustis, High Court Protects Internet Trash Talk, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Dec.
2, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WLNR 15029612.
69. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 377.
70. The Georgia Supreme Court also concluded that Cannon was a limited-purpose public figure,
and thus the trial court committed a reversible error because it failed to require Cannon to prove actual
malice. Id. at 383. As the court observed:
In reviewing Cannon’s role, we find that he was involved in the public controversy in
Crisp County in at least three ways. First, he was a crucial actor in helping the [waste
management] authority obtain the commitments from other county and city governments
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punitive damages because he had failed to request a retraction as
required in Georgia Code section 51-5-11.71
This decision, as Chief Justice Norman Fletcher explained in the
majority opinion, rested on the meaning of “publication” in the
statute.72 The Georgia Court of Appeals in 1984 had interpreted
“newspaper and other publication” to mean “a written publication”
produced by “print media.”73 But the Georgia Supreme Court
rejected that interpretation.74 Rather, the court took a second look at
the statutory language itself75 as well as legislative intent.76 It then
reached the following conclusions. First, the General Assembly in
1960 adopted the phrase “other publication” to replace “magazine or
periodical,” which suggests the legislature wanted the retraction
in south Georgia to provide solid waste for the authority’s facility. . . . Second, Cannon
represented the authority in a variety of ways that far exceeded the terms of TransWaste’s
contract to collect and haul solid waste to Crisp County. . . . Although he described his
position as an independent contractor who functioned as “the garbage man of the deal,” it
is difficult to distinguish between his efforts on behalf of the public authority and his
efforts on behalf of his private company. Using his personal contacts with city and county
officials developed from selling them heavy-duty equipment, Cannon solicited business
for the authority; this solicitation helped generate business for TransWaste as the
authority’s exclusive hauler. . . . Third, Cannon precipitated the financial crisis in
November 1999 by filing a lawsuit against the authority and then temporarily halting
deliveries to the solid waste recovery plant.
Id. at 382.
71. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 378; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(b)(2), (c) (2000).
72. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 383.
73. Id. at 384 (quoting Williamson v. Lucas, 320 S.E.2d 800, 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)).
74. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 384.
75. Id. The court detailed its analysis as follows:
A review of the libel and slander code sections, of which the retraction statutes are a part,
shows that the word “publication” is used in five different sections. O.C.G.A. [the
Georgia Code] § 51-5-1 defines libel as “a false and malicious defamation of another”
and requires that the “publication of the libelous matter is essential to recovery.”
O.C.G.A. § 51-5-2 defines “newspaper libel” as a “false and malicious defamation of
another in any newspaper, magazine, or periodical” and also requires the “publication” of
the libelous matter as essential to recovery. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-3 explains what constitutes
publication of libel: “A libel is published as soon as it is communicated to any person
other than the party libeled.” O.C.G.A. § 51-5-10 refers to the “publication or utterance”
of a statement. Finally, the retraction statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-5-11, uses the word in three
places. Subsection (a) provides that the retraction statute applies in any “civil action for
libel which charges the publication of an erroneous statement”; subsection (b) permits the
defendant to prove that a retraction has been published “in a regular issue of the
newspaper or other publication in question”; and subsection (c) permits the defendant to
plead the “publication of the correction, retraction, or explanation” in mitigation.
Id.
76. Id.
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statute to apply to media beyond the print variety.77 Second, both the
Georgia statute and common law have defined “publication” as
purely a communication to a third party, and therefore it should not
be taken solely as a synonym for print media.78 Third, restricting
“publication” to print references “makes a distinction between media
and nonmedia defendants that is difficult to apply and makes little
sense when the speech is about matters of public concern.”79 Finally,
the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the Georgia Court of
Appeals’ definition leaves little room to accommodate new types of
media.80
Thus, the majority opinion held that the word “publication” refers
to “a communication made to any person other than the party
libeled.”81 Under this interpretation, the retraction statute would
apply to any Internet posting, including Mathis’ message-board
comments.82 According to the justices, it should make no difference
whether the message-board comments in the case came from a
private citizen like Mathis or a news conglomerate:
77. Id. (pointing to legislative history that in 1960 “the General Assembly adopted the phrase ‘other
publication’ as a substitute for ‘magazine or periodical’ in the initial [1939] statute. This change
suggests that the legislature intended for the retraction statute to apply to more than ‘newspaper libel’ as
defined in O.C.G.A. § 51-5-2”).
78. Id.; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-3 (2000) (“A libel is published as soon as it is
communicated to any person other than the party libeled.”).
79. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 384–85. The Mathis opinion cites U.S. Supreme Court Justice White’s
concurring opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. Id. at 385 n.32. The relevant
part of that opinion is as follows:
[T]he First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it
does to others exercising their freedom of speech. None of our cases affords such a
distinction; to the contrary, the Court has rejected it at every turn. It should be rejected
again, particularly in this context, since it makes no sense to give the most protection to
those publishers who reach the most readers and therefore pollute the channels of
communication with the most misinformation and do the most damage to private
reputation.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
80. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 385 (“For example, under [the Georgia Court of Appeals’] view the
retraction statute would not apply to a story that appears only on the on-line version of a newspaper or
an advocacy group’s monthly electronic newsletter to its members reporting on congressional voting.”).
In their empirical assessment of tort law application to Internet cases nationwide, Professors Michael L.
Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig term the approach taken in Mathis as “a straightforward extension of
bricks and mortar tort principles to information technologies.” Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig,
Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 117 (2003).
81. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 385.
82. Id.
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Nothing in O.C.G.A. [the Georgia Code] § 51-5-11 precludes
applying the retraction statute to individuals. To the contrary, if
the purpose of punitive damages in libel actions is to punish the
speaker, it is fairer to prohibit punitive damages in actions
brought against individuals, who may communicate a
defamatory falsehood to one person, than to the traditional
press, which publishes the defamatory statement to greater
numbers of people. Also . . . there is no guarantee that a
retraction made by a newspaper, television station, or radio
station would likely reach the same audience that heard the
original defamatory statement. Therefore, a retraction posted on
an Internet bulletin board is as likely to reach the same people
who read the original message as any retraction printed in a
83
newspaper or spoken on a broadcast.

While the majority apparently saw it as an act of fairness to grant
individuals and media organizations the same protection from
punitive damages,84 Justice Hunstein’s dissent lambasted that very
idea: “In my view, the majority ruling which asks no self-censorship
of an Internet poster is unconscionable in that it allows Internet users
free reign to injure the reputations of others, even when the
statements cross the bounds of propriety.”85 Justice Hunstein also
took issue with the new interpretation of “publication,” suggesting
that if the Georgia legislature intended the statute to cover Internet
content, it would have rewritten the statute.86

83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 389 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 388 (“Instead, in plain and unequivocal language the legislature limited the application of
the retraction statute to defendants who regularly publish information by mandating that the libel
defendant correct and retract the allegedly libelous statement in the ‘next regular issue of the newspaper
or other publication’ following receipt of the demand for retraction.” (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 51-511(b)(1)(B) (2000))).
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II. OTHER APPROACHES TOWARD RETRACTION STATUTES
A. Judicial Interpretations In Other States
Whereas Georgia’s Mathis v. Cannon decision granted immunity
from punitive damages to any Internet “publication” willing to
retract, other states have not been as generous.87 Rather, the courts
have not been as generous—for it is the courts that have had the task
of applying their states’ pre-Internet retraction statutes to an online
world.88 These statutes vary in their wording, with several applying
only to defamatory statements published in a newspaper, magazine,
or other printed periodical.89 Even more statutes limit the retraction
requirement to print and broadcast media,90 while one statute simply
uses the broad term “publication.”91
1. Wisconsin: Print Media Does Not Equate with Online Media
Wisconsin is one state whose case law has gone in the opposite
direction of Mathis by declining to apply its retraction statute to
Internet message boards.92 In the 1995 case It’s In The Cards, Inc. v.
87. See, e.g., Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); It’s
In The Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
88. See Horton, supra note 16, at 1300.
89. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2010) (“newspaper”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2
(West 2010) (“newspaper, magazine, periodical, serial or other publication in this state”); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1446a (West 1993) (“newspaper or periodical”).
90. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.01–.05 (2003) (applies only to “libel in a newspaper
or magazine, or of a slander by radio or television broadcast”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-712 (2006)
(“newspaper” and “radio or television broadcast”); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-15-3-3, -4-1 (West 2008)
(“radio or television company,” “newspaper,” and “news service”)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.051,
.061 (West 2006) (“newspaper, magazine, or periodical” and “radio or television broadcasting station”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911(2)(b) (West 2000) (“radio or television broadcast,” “publication,”
and “other libel”). MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-1-5(2) (West 2007) (“newspaper” and “broadcast or
telecast”); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-818 to -821 (West 2009) (“publication in or broadcast on any
newspaper, magazine, periodical, radio or television station, or cable television system”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41.336(1) (West 2000) (“libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio or television
broadcast”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.03, .13–.14 (West 2009) (“broadcasting station” and
“newspaper company”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.210(1) (West 2003) (“newspaper, magazine, other
printed periodical, or by radio, television or motion pictures”).
91. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 93 (2000); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-840.01 (2008) (referring
simply to “any medium”).
92. It’s In The Cards, 535 N.W.2d at 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). The Wisconsin retraction statute
refers only to newspapers, magazines, or periodicals. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(2) (West 2006).
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Fuschetto, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that the retraction
statute only applied to newspapers, magazines, and periodicals, as
explicitly stated in the law itself.93 The court concluded that online
message boards do not qualify as “periodicals,” since the latter term
refers to publications that appear on a regular basis.94 The online
message boards, in contrast, are random acts of communication,
analogous to posting a written notice on a public bulletin board.95
It’s In The Cards further underscored the Wisconsin statute’s
print-only application. First, the opinion noted that the retraction
statute was not inclusive of all forms of written libel, as it did not
mention personal letters, billboards, signs, or even broadcast media.96
Second, the court recognized that the libel laws were enacted “before
cyberspace was envisioned,” and therefore “were written to manage
physical, printed objects, not computer networks or services.”97
Thus, whereas a message board poster in Georgia can avoid
punitive damages for an online libel merely because the plaintiff
failed to ask for a retraction,98 there would be no such “escape hatch”
for a Wisconsin poster in similar circumstances. The Wisconsin
plaintiff would not be required to seek a retraction before suing for
online libel—and in turn, the defendant would not automatically
avoid or lessen punitive damages by issuing such a retraction.99
93. It’s In The Cards, 535 N.W.2d at 14. The court ruled that the plaintiff did not have to seek a
retraction of the online content prior to filing suit. Id. The case involved two sports memorabilia dealers
whose argument regarding a postponed trip spilled over into communications posted on SportsNet, a
national network for memorabilia dealers. Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id. (“Posting a message to the SportsNet bulletin board is a random communication of
computerized messages analogous to posting a written notice on a public bulletin board, not a
publication that appears at regular intervals.”).
96. Id.
97. Id. The court further noted that:
[i]t is the responsibility of the legislature to manage this technology and to change or
amend the statutes as needed. Therefore, we conclude that extending the definition of
‘periodical’ . . . to include network bulletin board communications on the SportsNet
computer service is judicial legislation in which we will not indulge.
Id. at 15.
98. See discussion supra Part I.B.
99. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(2) (West 2006) (requiring the plaintiff to give the defendant a
“reasonable opportunity” to correct the allegedly libelous material and also limiting the defendant to
actual damages if a timely correction is published); It’s In The Cards, 535 N.W.2d at 14 (excluding
online sources from the Wisconsin retraction statute).
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Even more noteworthy than the different case law is how the
difference itself came about, with two courts interpreting similar
statutes. The Wisconsin statute refers to newspapers, magazines, and
periodicals.100 In turn, the Georgia law refers to newspapers or other
publications.101 Mathis seemingly turned on whether an Internet
communication was considered a “publication”102—a nebulous,
catch-all term that stands in stark contrast to the specific media
examples given in the Wisconsin statute.103 Yet both statutes were
written prior to the Internet’s advent, and thus any words selected at
that time clearly did not anticipate the World Wide Web.104
Wisconsin and Georgia courts thus shared the same problem—how
to apply laws from the print era to the burgeoning online universe—
but judicial interpretation led to different solutions.105
2. North Dakota: The Statute with the “Magic Words”
While states like Wisconsin and Georgia have wrestled to
analogize print references to online sources,106 North Dakota stands
alone with a retraction law that specifically encompasses Internet
sources.107 The North Dakota libel law refers to “all publications,
including writings, broadcasts, oral communications, electronic
transmissions, or other forms of transmitting information.”108
100. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(2) (West 2006) (“Before any civil action shall be commenced on
account of any libelous publication in any newspaper, magazine or periodical, the libeled person shall
first give those alleged to be responsible or liable for the publication a reasonable opportunity to correct
the libelous matter.”).
101. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(b)(1)(B) (2000) (stating that the defendant will not be liable for actual
damages if a retraction is published within seven days “in a regular issue of the newspaper or other
publication”).
102. Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 383 (Ga. 2002).
103. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(2) (West 2006); see also supra note 100.
104. The Georgia statute was amended to include “other publication” in 1960, more than thirty years
before the advent of the Internet. 1960 Ga. Laws 198, 199. As for the Wisconsin statute, “[t]he
magnitude of computer networks and the consequent communications possibilities were non-existent at
the time this statute was enacted.” It’s In The Cards, 535 N.W.2d at 14.
105. See Horton, supra note 16, at 1300 (noting that the current status of defamation law on the
Internet presents “new problems emerging from recent, but apparently unsuccessful, attempts by courts
to remedy the issues through judicial interpretation”).
106. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-43-02 (2008).
108. Id. (emphasis added). This section of the statute gives general definitions of what is covered
under libel law, while the following section lists the actual requirements for retraction: “A person may
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Such wording did not come about by chance. In 1995, North
Dakota’s legislators adopted the Uniform Correction or Clarification
of Defamation Act (hereinafter UCCDA), a draft model law
approved by the American Bar Association.109 The UCCDA’s
authors hoped that once it was widely adopted, it would result in
more uniformity in state court decisions regarding retraction.110 That,
however, has yet to happen, as North Dakota remains the only state
to have made the adoption.111
3. Florida and California: Applying the “Rapid Dissemination of
News” Standard
Having elected against adopting the UCCDA, Florida is now
among the states struggling with broadcast and print-oriented libel
maintain an action for defamation only if the person has made a timely and adequate request for
correction or clarification from the defendant or the defendant has made a correction or clarification.”
Id. at § 32-43-03.
109. Clay Calvert, Harm to Reputation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Impact of the Denial of
Defamatory Allegations, 26 PAC. L.J. 933, 943 (1995). Calvert provides a succinct summary of the
UCCDA’s origin:
The UCCDA was formally adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law in August, 1993, and subsequently was accepted by the American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates in February, 1994. The UCCDA provides in relevant
part that if a potential libel plaintiff fails to demand, in good faith, a correction or
clarification of the allegedly libelous statement or statements within ninety days after
knowledge of publication—or if the publisher runs a sufficient correction or clarification
once such a demand has been made—then the plaintiff is limited to recovering damages
for provable economic loss, such as lost wages or out-of-pocket expenses. Recovery for
all other forms of damages—including general and reputational damages—is barred if the
plaintiff fails to ask for a correction or clarification within ninety days after knowledge of
publication or if the publisher prints such a correction or clarification.
Id.; see also Wendy Tannenbaum, Model Defamation Reform Slow to Catch On, NEWS MEDIA & L.,
Apr. 1, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 6905734 (stating that the UCCDA was intended to help
correct or clarify an alleged defamation quickly while avoiding costly litigation).
110. Tannenbaum, supra note 109. A careful search by the author of published opinions uncovered
little to no case law regarding North Dakota’s retraction statute since 1995.
111. Tannenbaum, supra note 109. Perhaps one reason for state legislatures’ trepidation is a fear of
placing too much pressure on journalists:
From the media’s point of view, the concern is that there will be intense pressure to
publish a “correction” quickly in order to abort a potential libel suit. The [UCCDA] may
encourage hasty judgments about the statement’s accuracy and, in the process, sacrifice a
reporter’s reputation and the media’s credibility on the altar of expediency.
M. Linda Dragas, Curing a Bad Reputation: Reforming Defamation Law, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 113, 145–
46 (1995); see also Calvert, supra note 109, at 943 (noting that the UCCDA has been derisively dubbed
as the “Defaming Publishers Relief Act”).
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statutes.112 Yet unlike the Georgia Supreme Court in Mathis,
Florida’s judiciary has directly rejected a blanket application of its
statute to all Internet postings.113
According to Florida’s libel statute, the plaintiff must give a
“newspaper, periodical, or other medium” five days’ notice before
bringing a libel suit against the defendant.114 In 2000, the Florida
District Court of Appeal determined that “newspaper, periodical, or
other medium” excluded Internet postings made by a private
individual on a computer service operated by a third party.115 That
decision, Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., explicitly declined
to define “other medium” as inclusive of online sources; rather, it
held that the libel statute in general applied only to “media
defendants,” described as those “‘engaged in the dissemination of
news and information through the news and broadcast
media . . . .’”116 To the Zelinka court, a private individual who
“merely made statements” on a Yahoo! message board was not
involved in the “dissemination of news” and thus was not a media
defendant.117 Therefore, had the message board poster in Mathis been
in Florida instead of Georgia, he would not have qualified as a
“media defendant” and hence could have been sued for libel without
any notice, much less a request for a retraction.
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.01 (West 2005) (referring to defamatory statements in a “newspaper,
periodical, or other medium”); see also Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So. 2d 1173, 1173
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Florida’s libel statute to an alleged defamatory statement on an
Internet message board).
113. See Zelinka, 763 So. 2d at 1175.
114. Before any civil action is brought for publication or broadcast, in a newspaper, periodical,
or other medium, of a libel or slander, the plaintiff shall, at least 5 days before instituting
such action, serve notice in writing on the defendant, specifying the article or broadcast
and the statements therein which he or she alleges to be false and defamatory.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.01 (West 2005).
115. Zelinka, 763 So. 2d at 1175.
116. Id. (citing Mancini v. Personalized Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702 So. 2d 1376, 1380
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). The Zelinka court followed a string of Florida cases that had concluded the
retraction statute does not apply to non-media defendants. In Davies v. Bossert, the Florida District
Court of Appeal declared that the user of a citizen’s band radio was a non-media defendant because he
had greater time to ascertain the truth of his declarations compared to a mass-media entity. 449 So. 2d
418, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Six years later, the same grounds were cited in Gifford v. Brucker,
which found the defendant (the purchaser of a banner towed by an airplane) a non-media entity. 565 So.
2d 887, 888–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
117. Zelinka, 763 So. 2d at 1175.
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Like Florida, California’s judiciary also shied away from a limited
interpretation of the retraction statute.118 Although the California
statute lists the specific types of media it covers—namely, radio
broadcasts in addition to newspapers119—a recent court decision
suggests that online material may be covered by the retraction statute
only if the publisher’s main focus is the rapid dissemination of
news.120
In Condit v. National Enquirer, Inc., a federal court interpreting
California law observed that the legislature passed the retraction
statute to protect publishing enterprises that engage “in the
immediate dissemination of news.”121 The case involved the
Enquirer’s story about a former congressman’s wife verbally
assaulting her husband’s suspected mistress.122 The court concluded
that the Enquirer, which published the story both online and in print,
was not covered by the retraction statute because it did not focus on
the rapid dissemination of news and thus had time to verify the truth
of its allegations.123 The protection from punitive damages provided
by retractions, reasoned the court, should only be available to
enterprises that “cannot always check their sources for accuracy and
their stories for inadvertent publication errors.”124

118. See generally Condit v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
119. In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by
radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless a correction
be demanded and be not published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall
serve upon the publisher, at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place of
broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and
demanding that the same be corrected. Said notice and demand must be served within 20
days after knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be
libelous.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a(1) (West 2007).
120. Condit, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 948. The case involved the wife of former California Congressman Gary Condit, who
gained notoriety when one of his interns, Chandra Levy, disappeared. Id. Some time before July 26,
2001, The National Enquirer reported on its website that Mrs. Condit had phoned Levy and verbally
attacked her for five minutes. Id. Mrs. Condit alleged that local authorities debunked the report of a call,
but the Enquirer nonetheless posted the story, which gained national attention. Id.
123. Condit, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
124. Id. at 955 (“Section 48a extends protection in recognition of the necessity to disseminate news
while it is new, even if untrue, but whose falsity there is neither time nor opportunity to ascertain.”).
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The ruling in this case aligns with the result reached nearly twenty
years earlier in Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc.125 The Enquirer’s
defense included a claim that it had retracted an allegedly defamatory
statement about comedian Carol Burnett (which appeared in print
only), and thus was immune from punitive damages.126 The court
disagreed, finding that the tabloid, even in its print form, was not
considered a magazine or periodical under the libel statute:
It does not subscribe to the Associated Press or United Press
International news services. . . . It provides little or no current
coverage of subjects such as politics, sports or crime, does not
attribute content to wire services, and in general does not make
reference to time. Normal “lead time” for its subject matter is
one to three weeks. Its owner allowed it did not generate stories
127
“day to day as a daily newspaper does.”

In short, the Burnett court concluded that providing immunity
from punitive damages, via a timely retraction, should only be
allowed for those who generate content on a twenty-four-hour cycle
or run a daily deadline.128 The Enquirer does neither, and so it could
not use retraction as a shield against punitive damages. 129
B. Retraction’s Unique Role In Protecting A Free Press
Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc. and Condit v. National
Enquirer, Inc. both noted that the tight turnaround and pressure of
daily deadlines could result in potential factual errors.130 Hence, both
125. 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1001, 1004 (1983).
126. Id. at 997–98. In this well-known case, comedian Carol Burnett had sued the Enquirer (the same
tabloid defendant in Condit) over a short print item that described her as acting inebriated during a
dinner with Henry Kissinger. Id. at 996–97. The appellate court found that Burnett was not inebriated on
the night in question and that she was only introduced to Kissinger by a friend as she was leaving the
restaurant. Id. at 998–99.
127. Id. at 1000.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Condit v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Burnett, 144 Cal. App.
3d at 1000. Although the opinion in Burnett specifically cited the Enquirer for not having a daily
deadline, it further stated that the standard is not limited to daily dissemination, but rather “immediate
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courts reasoned, retraction’s “escape hatch” from punitive damages is
necessary so that newsgatherers can swiftly compile the facts needed
to educate the public, without the fear of litigation that results from
unintentional misstatements.131
The question then arises: Why should only entities involved in the
“rapid dissemination of news”132 be privy to this punitive-damage
immunity? After all, as the majority in Mathis pointed out, applying
the retraction statute to all Internet postings “supports free speech by
extending the same protection to the private individual who speaks
on matters of public concern as newspapers and other members of the
press now enjoy.”133 This egalitarian approach focuses on a
retraction’s ability to mitigate the immediate damage caused by the
alleged defamation—by encouraging quick corrections, a person’s
reputation will suffer less.134 Furthermore, scholars argue that a
timely retraction published in an equally prominent place ensures that
corrections will more likely reach the original audience, once again

dissemination of news on the ground that the Legislature could reasonably conclude that such
enterprises . . . cannot always check their sources for accuracy and their stories for inadvertent
publication errors.” Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1004 (quoting Field Research Corp. v. Super. Ct. of
S.F., 453 P.2d 747, 750 (Cal. 1969)). Twenty years later, Condit cited this language from Burnett.
Condit, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
131. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (“A rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments
virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’”); see also Erik Ugland,
Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 166 (observing that the Framers of the Constitution believed the press
would play an important watchdog role).
132. See Condit, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (quoting Field Research Corp. v. Super. Ct. of S.F., 453 P.2d
747, 751 (Cal. 1969)).
133. Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 385 (Ga. 2002). The opinion goes on to say that the ruling
“strikes a balance” in an age when “‘anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet’ can
address a worldwide audience of readers in cyberspace.” Id. at 386 (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997)). Other courts have made similar points in the past. In 1950, the
Supreme Court in California (the same state where Condit was decided) expressed concern that giving
newspapers and radio protection from punitive damages via retraction “will in effect allow these two
favored means of publication to escape, in most instances, scot free, since the plaintiff will not be able to
prove the exact special pecuniary loss he has suffered.” Werner v. Cal. Associated Newspapers, 216
P.2d 825, 838 (Cal. 1950).
134. See Stephanie Blumstein, Note, The New Immunity in Cyberspace: The Expanded Reach of the
Communications Decency Act to the Libelous “Re-Poster,” 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 407, 430 (2003)
(encouraging a case-by-case analysis to determine how much the retraction has actually lessened
damages).
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lessening any reputation damage.135 Finally, as the Internet allows
everyone to be his or her own reporter and publisher, scholars
suggest that these users will ultimately be wary enough of defamation
laws in general, so that they will be encouraged to investigate leads
and publish reports responsibly.136
Despite the seeming fairness of treating all Internet postings the
same under this egalitarian approach, it misses key realities. First,
defamatory material on the Internet can be quickly dispersed,
meaning that a single retraction on the source’s site could prove
meaningless in reaching the majority of the original audience.137 As
one scholar noted: “Once a message enters cyberspace, millions of
people worldwide can gain access to it. Any posted message or report
can be republished by . . . forwarding it instantly to a different
location, leading to potentially endless replication.”138
Second, anonymity is prevalent among the Internet, which can
make it difficult for parties to send the retraction request to the
correct publisher within the statutory time limit.139 On top of the
obvious mystery of not knowing whom to sue, defamed parties may
find it difficult to compel an Internet service provider (ISP) to release

135. See Benjamin Barron, A Proposal to Rescue New York Times v. Sullivan by Promoting a
Responsible Press, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 73, 91 (2007) (“A retraction is also more likely to reach the same
audience as the defamatory statement . . . .”). But see Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 385 (concluding there
actually is no guarantee that any retraction will reach the same audience, and reasoning that an Internet
retraction is just as useful because it is “as likely to reach the same people who read the original
message as any retraction printed in a newspaper or spoken on a broadcast”).
136. Barron, supra note 135, at 126 (“[A]s a normative matter, defamation liability should deter
individuals incapable of responsibly reporting from publishing injurious facts about others. If the
standard of responsible journalism is universally applied, people will be more likely to turn damaging
information over to individuals or entities with access to greater investigative resources.”).
137. If someone posts a defamatory statement somewhere on the Internet, that statement can
be instantly read by others, copied and pasted somewhere else on the Internet, and then
read by thousands more. Because the resulting damage inflicted upon the defamed person
or entity cannot be contained in one area on the Internet, issuing an effective reply or
retraction statement would be nearly impossible, making the damage even more severe.
Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply
to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1466 (2006).
138. Odelia Braun, Internet Publications and Defamation: Why the Single Publication Rule Should
Not Apply, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 325, 327 (2002).
139. See Jennifer Meredith Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger: Legal Protections, Self-Regulation and
Other Failures, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 343, 353–54 (2006) (noting that bloggers in several
recent defamation cases had posted their comments anonymously).
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the poster’s name.140 In Doe v. Cahill, for instance, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that defamed parties are required to first survive
a motion to dismiss, then post an online notification that the
anonymous poster is subject to a subpoena.141
Most significantly, however, newsgatherers have historically been
singled out as a group with a unique role in American governance.
While courts have not gone so far as to classify newsgatherers as a
category demanding special treatment,142 members of the press have
received specially crafted protections in the past, such as shield
laws.143 Furthermore, as Justice Potter Stewart declared, the press has
traditionally been the “Fourth Estate” that acts as a check on the three
branches of government.144 This special role, Justice Stewart
claimed, meant that the government should not hinder the press’
ability to “do battle against secrecy and deception.”145 The ruling in
Sullivan falls in line with this approach. By setting forth the higher
actual malice standard of proof for public officials who claim libel, it
provided the “breathing space” that would encourage reporters to
root out the truth.146

140. Id. at 355.
141. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
142. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(commenting that the Framers did not contemplate a “special” or “institutional” privilege for the press);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (holding in a divided vote that a newspaper reporter does
not have a First Amendment privilege to refuse to disclose his confidential sources when subpoenaed to
appear in front of grand juries). But see generally David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, Remedies,
Neutral Rules and Free Speech, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1183 (2006) (examining the press’ special legal
protections).
143. Ugland, supra note 131, at 125. Professor Ugland notes that Maryland became the first state to
pass a shield law to protect journalists’ confidentiality agreements in 1896. Id. at 175. A shield law is
defined as a “statutory privilege which allows a newsgatherer to decline to reveal sources of
information.” 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 526 (2010).
144. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
145. Id. at 636.
146. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964); see discussion supra Part I.A.1.
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III. REVISING GEORGIA’S RETRACTION STATUTE
A. Realigning Retraction As A Protection For The Fourth Estate
Like the actual malice standard, retraction is uniquely qualified to
provide “breathing space” to the Fourth Estate, by removing the fear
of crippling punitive damages for libelous statements that
inadvertently slip through in the rush to provide the public with news.
Such “breathing space,” however, is not necessary for an individual
who does not face a similar time constraint, and thus has the
opportunity to weigh the veracity and consequences of what she will
communicate. Indeed, to echo Justice Hunstein’s dissent in Mathis v.
Cannon, allowing such individuals the retraction “escape hatch” from
punitive damages discourages them from prudent self-censorship and
instead gives them “free reign to injure the reputations of others.”147
The need, therefore, is not for a reading of Georgia’s retraction law
that applies to all Internet postings,148 but rather a law specifically
written to apply to any publications—print or online—that are made
during the “rapid dissemination of news.” This standard, as
developed in case law, should be adopted as the statutory standard
that determines when retraction requests are mandatory for punitive
damages. In the case of Georgia’s statute, the phrase “regular issue of
the newspaper or other publication”149 could be trimmed to merely
“publication,” while the defendant could be stipulated as a “rapid
disseminator of news.” The days of Mathis, in short, should be
numbered.
B. Change Is A Good Thing: Making The Call To Abandon Mathis
The Mathis interpretation of Georgia’s retraction law calls for the
term “publication” to encompass all Internet postings, whether they
come from individual posters or mass media sources.150 Hence, the
Mathis court found the problem to be the statute’s silence on online
147.
148.
149.
150.
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references, and solved the problem by redefining “publication” to
cover all online material.151
A better approach, however, would be to fill that silence by
revising the statute altogether. On several occasions, Georgia’s
General Assembly has done just that. In 1957 the retraction statute
was altered from “newspaper, magazine or periodical” to a “regular
issue” of a “newspaper or publication.”152 Three years later, in 1960,
the law was again modified to say “regular issue” of a “newspaper or
other publication.”153 The Mathis court stated that the adoption of
“other publication” in lieu of “magazine or periodical” suggests the
legislature intended for the statute to cover more than just print
sources.154 That may be so, but in the 1950s online message boards
and blogs produced by single individuals were, safe to say, far from
any legislator’s mind.155 If the retraction law specifies the types of
media it covers, then changing media will inevitably call for
changing laws—though legislatures may forever be playing catchup.156
C. Function Versus Form: Shifting The Georgia Statute’s Focus To
The Condit Approach
1. Aligning the Statute to Protect the “Rapid Dissemination of
News”
To avoid this game of catch-up, the Georgia retraction statute
should turn its focus away from the type of publisher (print versus
151. See Horton, supra note 16, at 1297–98 (observing that the Mathis decision, though touching on
Internet postings specifically, in essence broadened the retraction statute so that all libel plaintiffs must
ask for a retraction before seeking punitive damages).
152. 1958 Ga. Laws 54, 54; 1939 Ga. Laws 343, 344.
153. 1960 Ga. Laws 198, 199.
154. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 384.
155. The Internet did not come into widespread use until 1995, when the U.S. government transferred
its management to independent organizations. See generally Julie J. Rehmeyer, Mapping a Medusa: The
Internet Spreads Its Tentacles, 171 SCI. NEWS 387 (2007).
156. See, e.g., Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 1315, 1344 (2009) (suggesting that evolving standards with online social networks will affect
future privacy law); Liebman, supra note 139, at 348 (pointing to the 1996 Communications Decency
Act, which freed Internet service providers from liability for their users’ content, as an example of
Congress reacting to the rise of Internet communication).
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Internet) or even the size of the publisher (newspaper, TV station,
blogger), and instead discriminate by the publisher’s function.157 As
Professor Erik Ugland observes, the Framers of the Constitution did
not enact the First Amendment to protect certain types of press, but
rather to protect the function of self-expression itself.158 And as
stressed in the seminal New York Times v. Sullivan case, defamation
law should maintain that “debate on public issues” be uninhibited,159
regardless of the form in which it appears.
The question then becomes which functions of self-expression
should fall under retraction law. In other words, when would a
publisher (either online or print) be in need of the “escape hatch”
from punitive damages? The answer is supplied in case law from
Florida and California.160
Of the two states, Florida offers the broader definition of the
functions that require retraction protection. In Zelinka v. Americare
Healthscan, Inc., the Florida District Court of Appeal merely limited
the retraction statute to “media defendants” that disseminate
information through traditional news and broadcast means.161 The
message board poster in Mathis, as a single individual,162 does not
fulfill this function and would obviously be excluded from this
protection. However, Zelinka remains unclear about what ultimately
constitutes a “media defendant”: it left open the idea that “someone
who maintains a web site and regularly publishes internet
‘magazines’ on that site might be considered a ‘media defendant.’”163
157. Ugland, supra note 131, at 123. Interestingly, Professor Ugland refers to this functional approach
as “egalitarian,” as it “emphasizes the function served by newsgatherers, and not their social or
professional status or credentials.” Id.
158. Id. at 170 (“It was not the unique skill, identity, or character of printers that the Framers sought
to protect; it was the function they served and the vehicle they provided for individuals’ expression that
warranted protection.”); accord First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978)
(finding that the First Amendment’s Press Clause “focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate
expression broadly” rather than the form of the dissemination).
159. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasis added).
160. See Condit v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Zelinka v. Americare
Healthscan, Inc., 763 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Burnett v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 991 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
161. Zelinka, 763 So. 2d at 1175; see also discussion supra Part II.A.3.
162. See discussion supra Part I.B.
163. Zelinka, 763 So. 2d at 1175 (emphasis added).
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Zelinka, therefore, focuses on the publisher disseminating
information “regularly.” The California cases further hone the
requisite frequency of publications. In Burnett v. National Enquirer,
Inc., the court concluded that only those media sources that faced an
immediate constraint of time were allowed punitive-damage
immunity via retraction.164 Specifically, the opinion denied retraction
protection to the Enquirer because it lacked “current coverage,”
“made no reference to time,” and had a normal lead time of one to
three weeks.165
Condit v. National Enquirer, Inc., in turn, combined Burnett’s
“time constraint” and Zelinka’s “information dissemination” to
define the “rapid dissemination of news” function.166 Here, any
publisher whose primary role is to publicize the story at a rapid pace
will need the protection provided by retraction: should a publisher
make an honest mistake in the rush to disseminate news, it will have
the chance to retract and thus avoid punitive damages.167 At the same
time, an individual online poster—like the defendant in Mathis—
would not be offered such protection, since he does not face a similar
time restraint and thus has the leisure to ponder the nature of
comments as well as their potential consequences.168 Protecting the
“rapid dissemination of news” function would therefore bolster
newsgatherers’ ability to report freely and quickly, while
simultaneously encouraging other publishers to continue their own
self-censorship.
2. Embracing All Forms of Media with the “Rapid Dissemination
of News” Standard
Such a standard as “rapid disseminator of news” would no doubt
cover most of the traditional, institutionalized newsgatherers.
Websites belonging to The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The New
164. See Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 1005; see also discussion supra Part II.A.3.
165. Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1000; see also discussion supra Part II.A.3.
166. Condit v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (E.D. Cal. 2002); see also discussion
supra Part II.A.3.
167. Condit, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
168. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
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York Times, or CNN would easily qualify, as each is a longtime
member of the mainstream media that updates its content daily, at a
minimum.169 Indeed, having a statute cater primarily to journalists
would not be unprecedented, as many states have passed shield laws
to protect reporters from revealing their sources.170
But even if journalists were the primary beneficiaries, such a
statute will not and should not shut out all smaller newsgathering
organizations, or even the single online poster.171 Mainstream
journalists, after all, do not have an elevated status in free
expression.172 Rather, “dissemination of news” should cover those
who perform a “press function—seeking out news of public interest
for the purpose of disseminating it to an audience.”173 There are two
elements involved: (1) offering the information to the public at
large;174 and (2) running the information through journalistic
standards so that it is fit to be read by the public.175 Such standards
include an editorial filter as well as verification of facts.176
With such a standard, some online material will be considered a
rapid dissemination of news, including blogs that practice editorial
169. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution is a daily newspaper, available at www.ajc.com. The New
York Times is a daily newspaper, available at www.nytimes.com. CNN is a basic-cable news network,
available at www.cnn.com.
170. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
171. Ugland, supra note 131, at 137–38 (“Because all people have the ability to serve this
investigative function—whether or not they have any relevant training, experience or credentials—these
prerogatives should not belong to a preferred class.”).
172. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
173. Ugland, supra note 131, at 137 (emphasis added); see also Troiano, supra note 137, at 1451
(referring to the “journalistic function” as “sharing news with the public”).
174. See, e.g., O’Grady v. Super. Ct., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1468 (2006) (defining “reporters” as
persons gathering news for dissemination to the public online).
175. See Liebman, supra note 139, at 351.
176. Id. Judging for journalistic standards by the material produced will prove more efficient than
judging the characteristics of the source itself. First, the nature of the material will be a good indicator of
whether there is a time constraint. For instance, consistently publishing late-breaking stories clearly
indicates that “rapid dissemination” is a common occurrence. More importantly, however, setting a
standard for the source would prove problematic. As Professor Ugland stated:
Looking to membership in professional associations might help, but because journalists
are not licensed like doctors and lawyers, many qualified journalists might not seek such
memberships. Education is another possibility, but certainly there are excellent reporters
and editors who do not have journalism degrees. Employment could likewise be the
operative criterion. . . . But this definition eliminates anyone supplying news who does
not receive a paycheck, including many freelancers and most bloggers.
Ugland, supra note 131, at 136–37.
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control and verification of facts.177 But many blogs and other online
sources would not qualify,178 and these are the sources that should
not receive punitive damage immunity via retraction. To do
otherwise would be to grant the same level of protection to all
sources, regardless of whether they take precautions (such as
verification and editorial control) to filter out unintended falsehoods.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly for legislatures playing
catch-up, the rapid dissemination of news standard can survive any
technological developments in the type of media that convey
information in the requisite fashion. Instead of having to repeatedly
rewrite the law to include all the forms of media that could apply—as
the UCCDA179 attempted to do—these emerging media will be
judged, as they arise, by whether they are used to quickly
communicate carefully verified news to the public. The retraction
statute, to borrow a technology term, will be “future-proofed.”
CONCLUSION
Refocusing Georgia’s retraction statute to cover only rapid
disseminators of news would render Mathis v. Cannon moot, and for
good reason. Mathis applies the retraction requirement to all online
content—from a media giant’s home page to a one-man blog180—and
thus allows any source to avoid punitive damages by simply pulling
down the offensive material. While the decision purports to put all
sources of information on the same playing field and grant the same
“escape hatch” from punitive damages,181 it fails to recognize key
realities about modern communication that the rapid dissemination of
news standard addresses head-on.

177. Ugland, supra note 131, at 137 (noting that “there is nothing to prevent a non-traditional
journalist or an ambitious do-it-yourselfer” from applying professional journalism standards).
178. See Liebman, supra note 139, at 352 (finding that only a minority of bloggers spend extra time
verifying facts, and that “just over a third of bloggers engage in activities similar to those of print
journalists, . . . [including] verifying the information that they post”).
179. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
180. See Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376, 385 (Ga. 2002).
181. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
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First, Mathis erases salient distinctions between newsgatherers and
other communicators, purporting instead to treat the traditional press
the same as an individual poster on a message board.182 The punitivedamage immunity, however, has to be earned: the information source
must not only police itself for inaccuracies,183 but it must be under
time constraints that would make an error excusable.184 Thus,
rewriting the retraction statute to allow a punitive damage immunity
for sources involved in the rapid dissemination of news and that also
perform editorial checks and controls would make these sources
“earn” this qualified immunity. At the same time, the retraction
statute would help maintain a “robust” press by freeing it from the
shadow of litigation for unintentional errors.185
The second reality that Mathis fails to consider is the persistent
evolution of communication methods, choosing instead to stretch the
understanding of the current statute’s use of “publication.”186 By
codifying the rapid dissemination of news standard, such a statute
can be applied to any new media that arises, because its function, not
its form, is being assessed.187
Finally, for all of its egalitarian assertions of treating all
communicators the same,188 Mathis ignores the reality that people
nonetheless need to be held accountable for harming reputations
online.189 Granting punitive-damage immunity via retraction to all
online communicators discourages responsible self-censorship,
whereas a switch to the rapid dissemination of news standard will
guarantee that the online world will no longer be a free-for-all for
off-color comments and damaging remarks.190 Just as with print, you
are bound by what you say on the Web—so speak wisely, and well.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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